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Of babies and bath water: Is there any place for Austin and Grice in discursive 
pragmatics? 
Abstract 
What do we mean by a 'discursive' approach to language study?  Some scholars 
may characterise it as placing emphasis on participant evaluations, others may 
foreground the analysis of contextualised and sequential texts, while still others 
consider it to include both of these.  In general, though, discursive pragmatics often 
seems to involve a reaction to, and a contrast with, so-called Gricean intention-
based approaches.  In this paper I argue that, far from discarding the insights of 
Grice, Austin and others, a discursive approach to pragmatics should embrace those 
aspects of non-discursive pragmatics that provide us with a 'tool-kit' and a 
vocabulary for examining talk-in-interaction.  At the same time, I will argue that the 
shortcomings of the speaker-based, intention- focused pragmatics can be 
compensated for, not by privileging hearer evaluations of meaning, but by taking an 
ethnomethodological approach to the analysis of naturally-occurring discourse data. 
By providing a critique of Locher and Watts' (2005) paradigmatic example of a 
discursive approach to politeness and then a sample analysis of interactional data, I 
demonstrate how a combination of insights from Gricean pragmatics and from 
ethnomethodology allows the analyst to comment on the construction and 
negotiation of meaning in discourse, without having recourse to notions of either 
intention or evaluation. 
Keywords: discursive politeness; discursive pragmatics; Grice; Austin; post-modern 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this special issue is to make a contribution towards defining, theorising, 
and perhaps delimiting, the relatively new area of discursive pragmatics. When there 
is a paradigm shift, such as this, in a research area, the old or 'traditional' ideas are 
sometimes all too easily discarded in favour of innovative approaches.  It could be 
said that this is in danger of happening with the discursive turn in politeness theory 
and, hence, in pragmatics generally. The move towards a 'discursive' approach to 
pragmatics seems to have gained momentum in the field of politeness research 
largely as a reaction to Brown and Levinson's (1978; 1987) treatment of linguistic 
politeness, much of which is entrenched in Gricean and Austinian pragmatics. Critics 
of Brown and Levinson (Eelen, 2001; Watts, 2003; Mills, 2003) have shown that this 
traditional approach to language in use (also characterised by Leech, 1983 and  
Levinson, 1983) has a number of weaknesses, largely arising out of a tendency to 
focus on speaker intention and decontextualised utterances.  The 'answer' to these 
criticisms is generally thought to lie with a discursive approach to data analysis, 
since it has the benefit of using stretches of naturally- occurring instances of 
language in use.  However, it remains unclear what exactly is entailed in a discursive 
approach.  For some theorists it may simply be the use of interactional data, 
whereas for others it necessarily involves 'evaluations' of norm-oriented behaviour 
(Locher 2006).  Still others assume that the discourse itself has a crucial role to play 
in the construction of meaning (for example, Kasper,  2006; Arundale, 1999, 2004, 
2010).  
In this paper, then, I want to argue that discursive pragmatics should not be regarded 
as the antidote to traditional, intention-based pragmatics, but rather that it should be 
regarded as a development of traditional pragmatics, which keeps the best of 
Austin's and Grice's insights but improves on their approach by applying it to 
discourse.  Furthermore, following Haugh (2007) I shall argue that a discursive 
approach  does not necessarily answer the criticisms levelled at traditional 
pragmatics unless it incorporates the sociological and ethnomethodological 
perspectives that underpin the work of Goffman ([1983] 1997), Gumperz (1982) and, 
more recently, Arundale's (1999, 2010) 'Conjoint Co-constituting Model of 
Communication'.  I shall argue that, in fact, rather than being the antithesis of post- 
modern thinking, Austin and Grice made many essential observations about 
language in use which still usefully, and crucially, apply to a discursive approach to 
pragmatics.  I will do this first by outlining how we can separate out those areas of 
intention-based pragmatics that should be discarded in favour of a discourse 
approach, whilst also demonstrating which insights should be retained.  In other 
words, this is an attempt to establish which principles and assumptions of traditional 
pragmatics should be dispensed with (to be thrown out with the bath water, so to 
speak) and those that should be incorporated into a discursive approach (the all-
important 'baby').  
Using already published examples of data from Locher and Watts (2005), in which 
the analysis might be considered a 'prime example' of the post-modern discursive 
politeness perspective, I will discuss the limitations of such an approach and then 
illustrate how traditional pragmatics can compensate for some of the pitfalls of a 
post-modernist analysis as long as it is combined with a sequential analysis of the 
construction and negotiation of meaning as a social achievement (Arundale,  2006).  
After re-working the Locher and Watts (2005) analysis, I will also refer to analyses of 
my own data, which similarly exemplify a sociological/interactional (Grainger, 2011a) 
approach to discursive data analysis.  
2. Defining a 'discursive' approach 
Many commentators link discourse analysis with post-modernism (Haugh, 2007; 
Mills,  2011) and it is easy to get the impression that a discursive approach 
necessarily involves post-modern principles. Indeed the terms are often used 
alongside one another, and sometimes interchangeably (Kadar, 2011). However, if 
taken literally, a discursive approach to the analysis of language could simply be one 
that examines 'discourse' rather than sentences.  In the first chapter of a volume of 
essays dedicated to "Discursive approaches to politeness" Mills states that "theorists 
are no longer content to analyse politeness and impoliteness as if they were realised 
through the use of isolated phrases and sentences."(Mills, 2011: 26).  This 
summarises what I would regard as the essential difference between discursive 
approaches and traditional approaches.  That is to say, discursive politeness and 
discursive pragmatics studies sequences of naturally-occurring connected talk and 
text.  Beyond this essentially methodological characteristic, I would argue, it is 
difficult to generalise as to what constitutes a discursive approach.   
One of the problems is, of course, that there are several conceptions of what 
discourse itself is.  According to Schiffrin et al. (2003), they all fall into one of three 
categories: "(1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a broader 
range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic and nonspecific instances of 
language" (2003:1).  The first of these is linguistically- oriented and treats discourse 
merely as a structure that is above the level of the sentence (Stubbs, 1983:1, Van 
Dijk, 1985).  The second refers to the more functionalist approach taken within 
pragmatics, sociolinguistics and the ethnography of communication.  Brown and Yule 
(1983) also identify these two definitions of discourse in suggesting that "discourse 
analysis on the one hand includes the study of linguistic forms and the regularities of 
their distribution and, on the other hand, involves a consideration of the general 
principles of interpretation by which people normally make sense of what they hear 
and read" (p. x).  Fasold (1990:65), on the other hand, defines discourse analysis as 
simply "the study of any aspect of language in use".  This functionalist approach, 
then, treats discourse as a part of human communication, with all the social and 
cultural influences that that entails.  
However, a third conception of "discourse" can be allied to Foucault's idea of a 
"system of regulated practices" (1972:80).  Thus, 'discourse' for Foucault and for 
critical discourse analysts such as Fairclough (1995) and Wodak (1996) is the entire 
socio-cultural context; discourse is "social practice" (Fairclough, 1992: 28). In this 
conception, very broadly speaking, although language is part of the discourse, it is 
not necessarily the main object of study and description.  According to Mills (2011) 
the main interest for Foucauldian scholars is "the role of discourse in constituting 
reality and social norms."  (Mills, 2011:27).  In this approach, " the term 'discourses; 
not only becomes a count noun, but further refers to a broad conglomeration of 
linguistic and nonlinguistic social practices and ideological assumptions that together 
construct power or racism." (Schiffrin et al.,  2003:1). This differs from functionalist 
and sociolinguistic approaches in that social context (as opposed to language) is the 
primary focus of analysis.  
However, it is the Foucaultian, post-modern definition which has been influential in 
the 'second wave' (Grainger, 2011a) politeness studies since about 1992, until 
recently.  In this conception of discourse, there is a tendency to assume that speech 
act theory, Gricean pragmatics and Brown and Levinson's conception of politeness 
are passe, unenlightened and of no relevance in contemporary theorising (Mills, 
2011).  At the very least, recent work in politeness theory often underestimates the 
contribution of traditional pragmatics to our understanding of the links between 
language form and meaning in interactions.   
In the next section I will outline which aspects of traditional pragmatic theory 
continue to have explanatory value even when applied to discourse, and those which 
should be abandoned because they hinder, rather than aid, the pragmatic enterprise 
of accounting for language in use.  
2. What's bad, and good, about traditional pragmatics. 
 In general, I would argue that the weaknesses of the Gricean approach are those 
assumptions that have been inherited from the field of truth conditional semantics 
(Lyons, 1977; Thomas, 1995), which formed the launching pad of Austin and Grice's 
work.  That is to say, in response to the assumption within logic that meaning resides 
in the 'propositional content ' of words and sentences (Searle 1969), Austin and 
Grice wanted to devise a way of accounting for meaning that goes beyond and 
between the actual form of language used. Yule (2006) calls this 'invisible' meaning.  
However, they did this in a way that still harked back to an encoding-decoding model 
of communication (Arundale,  2008),  which tended to refer to an idealised speaker 
or hearer and to concentrate exclusively on the transactional functions of 
communication, ignoring any relational function that might be encoded in language. 
This paradigmatic inheritance leads to a number of problems for the analysis of 
language as discourse.  These problems are covered well by a number of politeness 
scholars such as Eelen (2001), Watts (2003) and Mills (2003) and it is not my 
intention here to go into these arguments again in detail.  However, I would like to 
point out what aspects of the traditional approach may be usefully salvaged.  For this 
purpose, I divide the main objections to traditional pragmatics into four main areas: 
the problem of speaker intention, the problem of constructed examples of utterances, 
the problem of inherent meaning and the problem of universality. 
2.1. Over-emphasis on speaker intention 
Proponents of the discursive politeness paradigm often accuse Gricean and 
Austinian pragmatics of over-emphasis on speaker intention, partly because this 
privileges the speaker role at the expense of the hearer (Eelen 2001), and partly 
because it gives unwarranted status to the analyst's perspective, since it is they who 
judge what the speaker's intention is.  As a reaction to this, the work of Watts and 
Locher (Watts, 2005; Locher and Watts, 2005; Locher 2006), amongst others, has 
been prominent in arguing that politeness research should instead concentrate on 
the hearer's interpretation of utterances. The post-modernist argument that is 
reflected here is that, since all reality is 'subjective' (including that of the analyst), one 
can only report the subjective experience, interpretation and evaluation of the 
participants in an interaction, including that of the hearer.  This perspective is 
especially relevant to studies of impoliteness, where it is said that rudeness is a 
question of perception, not intention (Bousfield, 2008).  
However, it seems to me that for discourse analysts to criticise Austin and Grice for 
privileging the speaker misses the point slightly.  Indeed, it is not completely 
accurate, since Austin and Grice do both also talk about the role of the hearer. 
Austin's notion of perlocutionary force (the effect and utterance has on the hearer) is 
evidence of this. Thus Austin and Grice are fully cognisant of the role both speaker 
and hearer play in creating meaning. The real problem with their exposition is not 
that they privilege the speaker role but  that it is based on a simplistic encoding-
decoding model of communication (Arundale,  2008;  Mills,  2011) in which meaning 
is transmitted in a linear fashion from an idealised speaker (or 'model person', in 
Brown and Levinson's terms) to an idealised hearer.  From a social constructivist 
point of view, meaning is not to be found either in the hearer's interpretation or in the 
speaker's intention, since neither of these can be observed and thereby justified. 
This is not to say that speaker intention and hearer evaluation are not important as 
first order or 'emic' concepts.  In everyday discourse the question of whether the 
'real' meaning of an utterance resides with the intention or the interpretation is 
frequently a source of tension.  For example, in many UK workplaces anti-bullying 
policies state that it's how the action was perceived that matters, not how it was 
intended. Or someone who has caused offence in their remarks may defend 
themselves by saying "It was only a joke, I didn't mean it".  So intention is real for 
participants - people recognise it, claim it, and make moral judgements about it. 
However I would argue that while the interpretation of intention is important for the 
participants in the interaction (see Grainger, 2011b), suppositions about intention on 
the part of the analyst are not methodologically defensible.   
Therefore, in discursive politeness, simply shifting the emphasis from speaker 
intention to hearer evaluation can be just as problematic as focusing on speaker 
intention alone.  As Haugh (2007) and Arundale (2008) point out, this does not 
necessarily get away from an encoding/decoding model of communication.  
Furthermore, such post-modern approaches bring further problems of how to access 
these hearer evaluations (Mills, 2011); using hearers' post hoc evaluations risks 
reducing politeness to an account of how members use various words that describe 
moral behaviour (Terkourafi,  2005).  
As Arundale (2006; 2010) argues, a discursive analysis needs to instead concentrate 
on finding the meaning that is negotiated and constructed in the social space 
between the participants and which is observable in the construction and sequencing 
of linguistic messages. This involves taking the essence of Austin's insight that we 
"do things with words" (Austin, 1962)  and finding an analytic method that can 
demonstrate what the discourse (not the speaker or the hearer) is doing.  This 
involves invoking another of Austin's invaluable insights regarding the notion of 
participant 'uptake'.  In other words, the chief way in which the analyst can arrive at 
an interpretation is by showing how utterances are responded to and 'taken up' by 
the person to whom they are addressed; how participants respond to each others 
utterances (or take them up) is ultimately what they mean.  I illustrate in section 3 
and 4 below how Grices' theory of implicature and Austin's notion of uptake form 
important parts of the discourse analyst's toolkit. 
2.2 Decontextualised and contrived examples 
Another of the major criticisms levelled at traditional pragmatics is that it does not 
use 'real' data, situated in either linguistic or socio-cultural context.  This is certainly 
true of Austin and Grice, both of whom give sample 'utterances' which have been 
constructed, not observed, for the purposes of illustrating their arguments.  This, of 
course, is in the tradition of truth conditional semantics and for the sociolinguist 
interested in language as a behavioural (rather than philosophical) phenomenon, this 
is clearly methodologically unacceptable.  Indeed, Brown and Levinson (1987), in 
their introduction to the reissue of their theory of politeness, record their regret at 
using a mixture of naturally-occurring, elicited and intuitive data, saying that "The 
state of the art in discourse analysis would not let us get away with this today." 
(Brown and Levinson, 1987: 11).  
However, in placing the emphasis on 'discourse' as a human activity, the post-
modern approach to analysis can sometimes neglect the language itself.  This is, 
after all, what 'subjects' do when interacting - they naturally concentrate on 
interpreting what their interlocutor means not on how they are saying it.  As 
explained above, the post-modernist approach privileges the participant perspective 
and inevitably concentrates on how subjects themselves interpret intention.  
Unfortunately for pragmatics, this seems to mean that there is a tendency to focus 
analysis on the meaning of the context alone, at the expense of analysing how the 
language interacts with the context.  Thus, the traditional focus of pragmatics on 
language qua language, rather than simply a vehicle for thoughts and feelings, is in 
danger of being lost in the post-modern definition of a discursive approach.   
Perhaps the advantage for scholars such as Austin and Grice of using isolated 
sentences for exemplification was that they at least focused attention on the 
specifics of message construction.  Furthermore, we should concede to Austin and 
Grice that it was they who pointed out the importance of ordinary language and the 
"utterance" as opposed to the "sentence", which previously had been the unit of 
analysis for linguistics (Austin, 1962; Grice, 1975).  The concept of the 'utterance' at 
least acknowledges the importance of studying language as it is used naturally (i.e. 
we speak in utterances, not in sentences).  This, then, begins to move us away from 
the idea that meaning is contained solely in words and sentences and towards the 
idea that language is part of a system of communication between people (Thomas,  
1995).   
Brown and Levinson's work on politeness, while still largely in the Gricean tradition, 
builds on this by using examples of language that are not made up, but have actually 
been observed in use.  Thus, to a large extent, their model of politeness theory is 
grounded in 'real' data.  Furthermore, while it is true that they do not take account of 
the surrounding linguistic context (preceding and following turns at talk), their model 
does at least allow that the sociological variables of power and social distance have 
a bearing on message construction and provides a formula for working out the 
relationship between these variables and the form of the message (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987;74ff).  Nevertheless, there are still two major drawbacks to a model 
of language use not based on discourse data.  Firstly, as Mills (2011) points out, 
Brown and Levinson's concept of power and social distance is rather simple and 
deterministic (i.e. the interaction of certain levels of power and distance will give rise 
to certain types of politeness) and is a far cry from the Foucauldian and critical 
discourse analysts' concept of power in which the individual is subject to (not the 
agent of) the power of institutional discourses.  (On the other hand, we should note 
that not all discursive politeness aims to comment on the "wider political" (Mills 
2011:26) meaning of discourse).  Secondly, the fact that Brown and Levinson only 
use isolated utterances for exemplification results in their model being flawed.  When 
it is applied to sequences of talk (discourse), it turns out that it does not have the 
predictive power claimed for it (for example, Brown and Levinson's model cannot 
predict politeness behaviour, although it may be able to account for it, or describe it) 
and that certain crucial concepts, such as the distinction between negative and 
positive politeness are problematic (see, for example, Grainger, 2004).  
2.3 Meaning is not inherent in speech acts  
Mills (2011) points out that much post- Brown and Levinson politeness research 
erroneously attempts to tie particular forms of language to particular speech acts.  As 
she quite rightly observes, "this kind of post-Brown and Levinson work does not 
acknowledge that requests, compliments and apologies can be performed using a 
very wide range of linguistic realisations" (2011:21-22) and thus Austin's attempt to 
provide "a list of illocutionary forces" (Austin, 1962: 150) (speech acts) by linking 
them to particular verbs found in the dictionary is, from the point of view of a 
discourse analyst, a pointless endeavour.  Even Brown and Levinson themselves 
(1987) acknowledge the limitations of basing their 1978 framework on the notion of 
the speech act which "forces a sentence-based, speaker-oriented mode of analysis" 
(p. 10). They propose instead a discursive, sequential approach in which categories 
of utterance types (such as 'request') are "directly demonstrable" in sequences of 
utterances (Brown and Levinson 1987:10).   
And yet, as Brown and Levinson (1987) also observe, it is difficult to avoid the notion 
of the speech act, at least as a shorthand for certain utterance-types.  I would even 
go so far as to say that discursive pragmatics needs this concept in order to account 
for why certain forms of words should be associated with certain meanings and acts 
of politeness (Kasper, 2006).  Of course, there is no one-to-one relationship between 
linguistic form and meaning.  Indeed, it is Austin's (1962) work that first alerted 
linguistic philosophers to this fundamental observation.  Austins' chief observation 
that all utterances are doing something (complimenting, apologising, requesting and 
so on), as well as saying something, goes some way to explaining how it is that 
speakers and hearers understand one another if part of their meaning is "invisible" 
(Yule,  2006).  In other words, participants in an interaction interpret what the other 
person is doing, as an act of communication.  Searle's (1969; 1971) development of 
Austin's work has also had lasting usefulness in pragmatic theory.  He attempted to 
lay down the conditions under which certain speech acts could be understood, and, 
although any attempt to produce an exhaustive taxonomy now seems futile, 
politeness theory can still make use of the notion of 'felicity conditions' in order to 
explain why a communicative act can be realised in several ways linguistically.  Thus, 
for a promise to be made, any number of linguistic realisations can be used as long 
as the basic conditions of the propositional content rule (that the utterance 
predicates some future act), the preparatory rule (that the hearer would like the 
speaker to do the thing promised), the sincerity rule (that the speaker must intend to 
do the thing promised), and the essential rule (that the utterance counts as an 
undertaking to do the thing promised) (Searle, 1971) have been fulfilled.  Although 
one could quibble with the details of these felicity conditions, the existence of such 
conditions can explain precisely why, for example, uttering the words "I'm sorry" do 
not necessarily constitute an apology, or conversely, why saying something like "I 
know I did wrong. I will make it up to you" can be taken up as an apology (Mills, 2003; 
Grainger and Harris, 2007). 
Grice's theory of conversational implicature and Brown and Levinson's theory of 
politeness also both attempt to account for how and why people say things that they 
do not literally mean.  It is this attempt to explain relationship between the form of 
words and what it achieves in interaction that provides the analyst with a tool-kit for 
examining interaction (O'Driscoll,  2007: 486). 
2.4 Universal principles of communication and Eurocentric assumptions  
 It has frequently been pointed out by politeness scholars that Brown and Levinson's 
model of politeness, although it claims to be universal, in fact makes many 
Eurocentric and Western assumptions (Kadar and Mills, 2011).  In particular, their 
'model person' "fetishises" (Coupland, Grainger and Coupland, 1988) the individual 
as the locus of all interaction and does not take account of group identities and 
allegiances (Nwoye, 1992; Mao, 1994).  Similarly, the notion of negative face (the 
desire for freedom of action), having equal weight with positive face, (the desire for 
social affiliation), is thought to be a peculiarly Western idea that stems from 
individualistic cultural values.  Cross cultural discursive pragmatics has clearly 
shown that these notions do not readily apply to interaction in non-western settings 
(Spencer-Oatey and Xing,  2000; Cheng,  2003). 
The universalist stance is, arguably, anathema to post-modern theorists, since in 
post-modernism, all meaning-making is fluid, negotiable and relative to the socio-
cultural situation in which it takes place.  As Mills (2011) states "Post-modernism 
might be seen as a type of theoretical move which questions all concepts and 
evaluations and is sceptical of…all overarching theories which attempt to generalise 
of universalise." (page 28).  In this view, there can be no such thing as universal 
principles of interaction since communication depends so much on participants' 
interpretation.  Thus, while most politeness scholars would agree that politeness 
itself is universal, they do not all agree that Brown and Levinson's account of it is 
universally applicable.   
Certainly, it seems to me that the particulars of Brown and Levinson's theory 
concerning the different types of politeness and their rankings can easily be 
questioned in terms of their universality (they do not even apply to all Western 
interactional situations, let alone other cultures) and this is especially evident through 
a discursive approach to analysis, where context is taken to be part of meaning.   
Austin and Grice are perhaps even more guilty of ethnocentrism than Brown and 
Levinson since all their examples are from English and they do not make it explicit 
whether their claims apply to all languages or just to the English-speaking World.  
Grice's cooperative principle and the four maxims entailed in it can be questioned on 
the grounds that they assume a particular (Western) idealised view of 
communication in which clarity, brevity, truth and relevance are valued above other 
qualities (such as attention to group norms).   
However, perhaps the importance (or not) of universality depends on what the 
analyst is attempting to do.  If the aim is to account for how, and whether, people in 
different parts of the World and in different situations orient towards their own 
behaviour in terms of 'politeness' (cf. Terkourafi,  2005), then a relativist position may 
be warranted.  However, if one is interested in theorising about how language 
mediates human relations and how this varies depending on the social conditions, 
then an account which merely concludes that "it depends on the participants' 
interpretation" is rather unsatisfactory.  Furthermore, to dismiss the universality of the 
existence of speech acts, of implicatures and of politeness as face mitigation is to 
lose something valuable that traditional pragmatics can offer the discursive analyst.  
While it is true that both Grice and Austin may be privileging the role of the individual 
in interaction, the fundamental ideas of conversational cooperation and speech-as-
action still underpin much  pragmatic and politeness research that is done beyond 
the western World (Brown and Levinson, 1987).  These central concepts give us the 
tools with which to provide a robust analysis of socially situated interaction.  
Furthermore, and perhaps ironically, these two notions are closely allied to a 
constructivist orientation to discourse analysis, which is one of the central tenets of a 
post-modern approach. 
3. An example and critique of post-modern analysis 
At this juncture, I provide an example of a non-Gricean, post-modern discursive 
analysis of politeness that seems to illustrate many of the problematic features 
discussed above.  A good example can be found in Locher and Watts' (2005) 
analysis of dinner party conversation.  For my purposes I will just examine here two 
examples of compliment-giving that (amongst others) are discussed in the original 
article. I first critique Locher and Watts' analysis, before giving my own analysis, 
which reaches different conclusions about the nature of the speech events under 
discussion.  The data are taken from Locher's set of dinner party conversation, 
involving 7 friends.  Anne and John are the hosts, Anne having cooked the dinner. 
 
Example1: complimenting the cook1 
 
This interaction takes place towards the end of the dinner: 
1  Kate: Steven is a terrific chef. 
2  Steven:  nah. 
3  Roy:  yeah. 
4  Steven: X it's a lot of effort. X 
5  Roy:  but it's not as good as this. 
6  Steven: this is very good. 
7  Anne: which one?  
8  Kate: your [dinner was fantastic.] 
9  Anne:         [Kate please] for heavens sake @ come on Kate @. 
  just a bird. 
10 Kate: ..nice birds...well this was delightful 
                                            
1
 the transcription conventions are reduced version of those used by Locher and Watts, which are 
based on Dubois et al. 1992 
 
11 Anne: well thank you.  
12 Kate: just delightful. 
13 Miriam: thanks very much.  Steven: this person who came out- 
14 Anne: you're very welcome I'm glad  a week or so ago 
        about, 
  I re-      about some XX 
        genetic XX. 
15 Kate:  [I've known her since she was four years old. when she was a 
  tiny little girl.] 
16 Anne:  [I'm trying to think, really,] 
 
 
Example 2: complimenting the daughter 
 
This interaction takes place at the beginning of the evening, just after Debbie, the 
hosts' teenage daughter, has entered the room: 
1.  John: X it's totally totally [iiii] xxx xx. x 
2.  Kate:                              [perfect] 
3.  Roy: nice to see you how are you?  
4.  nice to see you . 
5. Debbie:    nice to see you X XX. X 
6. Kate: God does she look gorgeous. 
7. Roy: here you go lady. 
8. Debbie: thank you. 
9. Kate: Deb? every time I see you, you're more beautiful. 
10.  and I don't know how much more beautiful you can get? 
11. Miriam: @@. 
12. Kate: it's unbelievable. 
13.  [it doesn't] stop does it.  
14. Debbie: [thank you.] thank you @@. 
15. Kate: it doesn't stop.   
16. Debbie: @@ 
17. Kate:  she looks absolutely gorgeous. 
18. Steven: you got on the phone and said Debbie. and I thought, 
 These data are without question, extremely rich examples of relational face-work, 
coming from sequences of naturally occurring and contextualised talk.  Locher and 
Watts' main focus at this point in their paper is to argue against the concept of 
politeness as a universal and to argue for the concept of 'politic' behaviour by 
comparing the relational work that goes on in the two incidents of compliment -giving.  
They claim that the difference between the two examples is that compliments to the 
chef are merely following an expected "line" (p.  25) and so are unmarked, whereas 
compliments to the hosts' teenage daughter on her appearance are not necessarily 
an expected part of the interaction. In the former case, complimenting the food at a 
dinner party is required etiquette, in the other the compliments are strategies that 
"aim at making a participant feel good" (p. 26). In keeping with the post-modern 
concern for 'subjectivity' the ensuing analysis apparently reflects participants' 
perspectives on the interaction, for example, "Kate makes sure that her compliments 
are heard …" (p. 26) and "The humour in Kate's contributions also makes it easier 
for Debbie to accept the compliments (p.  26). The analysis is limited to paraphrasing 
and evaluating the participants utterances, for example, "Roy, Steven and Miriam all 
compliment and thank Anne, who first rejects the praise…and then accepts" (p. 24), 
"The compliments are met by laughing acceptance on Debbie's side" (p.  26).  This is 
little more than what the participants themselves do as they are engaged in the 
conversation and begs the question raised by Mullany (2005) and Haugh (2007) as 
to what the role of the analyst is in this type of study.  Furthermore, the claim that 
example 1 is unmarked, and therefore not politeness, whereas example 2 is marked 
and therefore politeness is itself quite subjective and not motivated by any 
independent criteria.  There seems to be an assumption that this is how the 
participants themselves evaluate the events, but this is not evidenced in the 
interaction itself.  What is missing is a theory of language-in-interaction with which to 
analyse these data in a less impressionistic way.  I will now illustrate how Speech act 
theory, Grice's theory of implicature and politeness theory do at least provide some 
of the tools with which to offer a technical account of the pragmatic function of 
speech events, such as compliments.  However, in taking this approach, I reach 
different conclusions about the way compliments function in interaction. 
 
Firstly, although the speech act of complimenting does not inhere in any particular 
form of words (as Locher and Watts quite rightly say), neither is it determined solely 
by the norms of the situation.  Without any visible evidence that the participants are 
orienting to the speech acts as compliments, the observation that example 1 is 
'normal' complimenting behaviour (and therefore 'politic') whereas example 2 is non-
normative (and therefore 'polite') is simply an assumption.  However, invoking some 
of the concepts from speech act theory helps us to see how the compliments are 
constructed or received by the participants.  Thus, what identifies these two incidents 
as containing compliments is partly that they fulfill the 'felicity conditions' (Austin,  
1962) of a compliment and partly that they are 'taken up' (Austin 1962) as 
compliments.   So, for example, we can posit that a compliment works as a 
compliment when (a) a favourable assessment is made about a person and (b) this 
evaluation is directed at the person they are intended for.  Therefore, "Does she look 
gorgeous", said in the presence of the person referred to, has the function of a 
compliment, not as an observation about someone not present.  Furthermore, we 
can see that in both cases the complimenting speech act (which, of course, are only 
compliments in this context) ("this was delightful "and " God does she look gorgeous") 
is oriented to as if it were a gift (Brown and Levinson, 1987), from the speaker to the 
hearer; in both cases the addressee responds with thanks. This analysis suggests 
that, in contrast to what Locher and Watts (2005) suggest, the two speech events 
are in fact similar for the participants.  They may or may not inwardly identify them as 
'polite' but the evidence from the interaction is that they are being oriented to in 
similar ways.    
 
Of course, there are differences between the two examples in terms of how the 
compliments are received, but I argue that the main differences between the two 
speech events is not to do with which behaviour is normative and therefore 
unmarked (which it seems to me is taking a fairly deterministic view of behaviour in 
social situations).  Rather, it is to do with the fact that in example 1 the compliment is 
first rejected before it is accepted and in example 2 it is merely accepted. This, I 
would suggest, could be explained in terms of the theoretical concept that underpins 
Brown and Levinson's politeness theory, that of face management.  As Cameron 
(2001) explains, compliments present a dilemma for interlocutors in that any 
response is potentially face-threatening.  Acceptance makes the recipient look 
immodest, while rejection questions the judgement of the complimenter.  Cameron 
suggests that thanking may be the best compromise.  This may explain why Debbie 
only thanks her complimenter, whereas Kate first rejects the compliment before 
accepting it.  Debbie has a trickier face-management task than Anne because she is 
in a relatively powerless position (being a generation younger than all the other 
participants) and because the compliment itself concerns her looks rather than her 
skill. It is perhaps interactionally more difficult to dispute one's good looks with 
someone much older than to dispute one's skill at cooking with a peer.  Hence 
Debbie sticks to the 'safer' option of merely thanking Kate.  
4. Towards a sociological/interactional discursive pragmatics  
The foregoing analysis of Locher and Watts (2005) data has argued that the 
inclusion of concepts from non-discursive approaches to pragmatics can enhance 
the analysis of interactional data.  Notice, however, that contextual and sequential 
aspects of the discourse remain important in interpreting the construction of meaning.  
Thus, as well as speech acts, preceding and subsequent turns at talk are relevant, 
as are the social roles and relationships of the participants.  This would point to an 
eclectic mix of analytic approaches to interactional data, that combines pragmatics 
with conversation analysis, as suggested by Goffman [1983] 1997:171-2) and 
Gumperz (2003 :218).  Within pragmatics, some scholars see similar benefits to 
combining a constructivist orientation with traditional concepts and theories.  Kasper 
(2006) states that we need to apply conversation analysis to speech act research 
and calls this a "discursive approach to speech act pragmatics" (page 282).  As part 
of the "third wave" of politeness theory (Grainger 2011a; Culpeper 2011), O'Driscoll 
(2007) suggests that Brown and Levinson's theory provides an objective empirical 
tool for the analysis of interaction.  Haugh (2007), in pointing out some of the 
weaknesses of the post-modern approach, advocates an empirically sound and 
primarily ethnomethodological approach to the analysis of politeness phenomena. 
Arundale's (1999; 2008; 2010) 'Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communication'  
regards interaction as a "minimum social system" (Arundale 2010: 2086).  Thus, it is 
in the interaction that we should look for the construction and reconstruction of 
meaning in terms of individual attiributes (such as identity), societal systems and 
social norms.  Below I illustrate how such an interactional approach can usefully 
combine the benefits of Gricean pragmatics with those of ethnomethodology.  
4.1 An intercultural example 
The extract below was first discussed in Grainger (2011b) where I use it as an 
example of different norms of indirectness as politeness in British and Zimbabwean 
culture2.  The extract is taken from a set of data collected by myself from my own 
interactions with Zimbabwean acquaintances living in Britain.  In this instance I am 
congratulating "Lizzie" on achieving refugee status, but I am also wondering if this 
means she will no longer want to come and clean house for me, since she will now 
be able to look elsewhere for employment.  The interaction takes place at my house, 
where Lizzie has arrived to do some cleaning: 
1.  Karen: Congratulations on getting your papers 
2.  Lizzie: Yes I was very happy 
3.  Karen: So you'll be looking for a job now? 
4.  Lizzie: Yes I'm looking for accommodation at the moment 
5.  Karen: Oh do you have to move out? 
6.  Lizzie: Yes on the 13th. That's why I want to move to L___ 
7.  Karen: Oh do you have someone you can stay with there? 
8.  Lizzie: Yes my brother 
9.  Karen: We'll miss you if you go 
10. Lizzie: Thank you for everything you've done for me. You have helped                 
        me a lot 
11. Karen: You've helped us too 
12. Lizzie: Next week I'll be coming on Wednesday 
13. Karen: OK that's OK. And will you be coming the week after that? 
14. Lizzie: No. Next week is my last week. 
The main thrust of the discussion of these data in Grainger (2011b) is that Lizzie is 
more indirect in giving me notice to quit than I would have expected in this situation.  
But rather than couching the argument in terms of the subjective positions of the two 
participants (for example by giving their post-facto explanations of what they 'meant'), 
                                            
2
 Here I am using "culture" as a shorthand for the different norms and interpretive frameworks that can 
characterise geographically and socially differentiated groups. I appreciate that it is a problematic 
concept which is discussed at more length in Grainger, Mills and Sibanda (2010). 
the evidence can be found in the interaction itself if concepts from Grice and Austin, 
along with attention to sequence and structure, are brought to bear on the analysis.    
First, if we look at line 3, Karen's question could be a veiled attempt to find out if 
Lizzie intends to continue cleaning for her.  In other words, as a speech act it is 
ambiguous because the speaker could have more than one 'intention'.  In this case 
Karen is, of course, also the analyst so it would be possible for me to give an 
explanation of my intentions.  However, as Haugh (2007) has pointed out, this would 
not necessarily be a reliable account of what was intended at the time.  Indeed, I 
would go further than this and say that interactants do not necessarily know even at 
the time of speaking what it is they intend, because they are busy constructing and 
negotiating meaning as they go along.  So, in this instance I can recount that, yes, I 
was generally interested in knowing whether Lizzie would continue to clean for me, 
but I couldn't say with any certainty whether, at that particular juncture in the 
conversation, this was forefront in my mind.  Furthermore, we do not have access to 
what Lizzie was thinking or feeling as the recipient of this question.  However, we do 
have access to what she says next, and her response can be analysed in ways 
which combine conversation analysis and pragmatics.  First, Lizzie's response is the 
second part of an adjacency pair (Sacks et al.,1978) and as such is treated as a 
response, regardless of its content.  Secondly, in terms of "uptake" (Austin 1962), 
Lizzies' response ("yes") is partly an affirmation of the propositional content (Searle, 
1969) of Karen's question (that she will be looking for work) but also partly moves 
away from the topic of job-seeking.  In other words, regardless of how she may be 
inwardly interpreting Karen's question, she does not pursue the topic of job-seeking.  
Thirdly, Lizzie's response flouts Grice's maxim of quantity (and possibly relevance) 
which suggests that some additional meaning-making is going on here.  Fourthly, a 
plausible explanation for this conversational non-cooperation is in terms of Brown 
and Levinson's general conception of politeness:  that face-threatening acts motivate 
politeness strategies.  The motivation for changing the subject is because telling your 
employer that you are looking for another job is face-threatening to both participants. 
Avoiding the topic is therefore one strategy open to interactants.  However, as I have 
noted elsewhere (Grainger 2011b) Brown and Levinson's treatment of 'off record' 
strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1978; 1987) is missing a consideration of sequential 
matters, since it does not specifically account for topic avoidance, such as we see in 
this example.  
In subsequent turns we can further see how the participants construct meaning 
between them.  In line 5 Karen pursues the topic of moving and at line 6 Lizzie 
introduces the topic of moving cities.  This could be a hint that she will no longer be 
available to work for Karen, but Karen does not apparently take it up as such until 
line 9 where she uses a conditional formulation ("if you go").  This reflects 
uncertainty about whether Lizzie will continue to come to the house to clean.  
Following this, notice that Lizzie's response on line 10 does not take up this 
conditional directly, but instead includes formulaic politeness that assumes we have 
come to the end of our arrangement ("thank you for everything you've done for me").  
Karen's question at line 13 ("will you be coming the week after that?"), is a direct 
question about future arrangements but is oriented to the implied message in Lizzie's 
earlier turn. This suggests that Karen and Lizzie have achieved some level of 
agreement but it is only after Lizzie has delivered the face-enhancing news on line 
12 ("Next week I'll be coming on Wednesday"), that she makes it explicit on line 14 
that "next week is my last week". 
In sum, the foregoing analysis is what I would like to see in a 'discursive' approach to 
pragmatics.  The data are from a naturally-occurring  interaction, about which I (the 
analyst) have some contextual information.  However, any interpretations I may put 
upon what either speaker 'means' are firmly grounded in what they actually say and 
how each turn at talk provides a context for the next turn.  This consideration of the 
structure and sequence of turns is complemented by theoretical explanations of how 
talk-in-interaction works, in terms of speech acts, conversational cooperation and 
face-work. In this way, the claim that politeness in the form of indirectness is present 
in this interaction is richly justifiable.   
5. Conclusion  
There is no question that traditional, Gricean pragmatics is flawed in terms of its 
focus on speaker intention, the use of decontextualised, invented utterances and 
ethnocentric assumptions about the nature of interaction.  However, a post-modern 
take on discursive approaches to politeness and pragmatics do not necessarily 
answer these criticisms adequately.  Indeed, they may bring with them their own 
problems.  Specifically, they tend to over-interpret utterances in terms of the 
contextual norms, without empirical evidence for doing so.  I have argued in this 
paper that some of the analytical rigour that is missing can be brought back by 
referring to those aspects of Austins', Searle's and Grice's work that are fundamental, 
universal insights about language- in- interaction.  However, what both a post-
modernist approach and a traditional approach often lack is an appreciation for the 
way meaning is achieved collaboratively and dynamically in the moment of talk.  A 
third approach - that of conversation analysis - provides us with the necessary 
constructivist perspective. The challenge for discursive pragmatics, then, is to exploit 
the valuable insights from all these approaches in order to reach a rich and 
empirically sound analysis of interactional data.  
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